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NOTE
PARAMOUNT REVISITED: THE RESURGENCE
OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN THE
MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY
As in all industries, those few individuals who control the motion picture industry have, from the start, vehemently sought to guarantee their control and shape growth. With this desire to control comes an inevitable conflict with the policies that underlie antitrust
regulation. In the motion picture industry, absolute control is derived
from the domination of its three divisions: production, distribution,
and exhibition.' This Note will examine the trend, rekindled during
the Reagan administration, of major movie producers and distributors
reentering, through the acquisition of both individual theaters and
large motion picture theater circuits, the business of exhibiting "first
run!" motion pictures in the United States.
This exploration will commence with a brief historical overview
of the monopolistic practices that existed in the industry and the resulting divorcement of the business of motion picture exhibition from
distribution and production, which took place in the 1940s as a result
of United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.3 The focus will next
shift to the deregulatory scheme of the Reagan Administration, with
specific attention paid to that Administration's policies towards anti-

1. See Ralph Cassady, Jr., Impact of the Paramount Decision on Motion Picture
Distribution and Price Making, 31 S. CAL. L. REV. 150 (1958).
2. To obtain the maximum revenue from motion pictures, they are released in a series
of runs to theaters across the country. "lFirst run" indicates a picture's initial widespread
release to "high gross" theaters. Subsequently, the films are released to lower gross theaters
until the "eaming capacity of the film is finally depleted." See Cassady, supra note 1, at
152; see also JOHN IZOD, HOLLYWOOD AND THE BOX OFFICE 1895-1986, 19 (1988). Recently, with the advent of the VCR and cable television, subsequent runs for motion pictures
have been all but eliminated. These alternative outlets for exhibition have captured the dollars
once available for second, third, or fourth run movie theaters. See United States v. Columbia
Pictures Inc., 507 F. Supp. 412, 418-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); see also Harry Boadwin, Product
Market Definition for Video Programming, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1210, 1229 (1986).
3. 66 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), 70 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 334 U.S. 131 (1948), on remand, 85 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), aff'd,
339 U.S. 984 (1950); see also infra notes 6-88 and accompanying text.
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trust laws, and the motion picture industry in particular.4 Lastly, the
effects that the Reagan Administration's deregulations have had on
the entire motion picture industry will be examined.'
I. THE PARAMOUNT CASE

Since the formation of the motion picture industry by individuals
such as Thomas Edison, Louis and August Lumidre, C. Francis
Jenkins, and Thomas Annat in the 1880s, 6 movie producers and distributors have attempted to control the industry by engaging in a
multiplicity of anti-competitive tactics.7 Originally, monopolies were
attempted through the ownership and protection of patents on the
equipment and technology needed to produce and exhibit motion pictures.8 As technology advanced, the power that these patents could
provide decreased. In an attempt to maintain control, industry leaders,
led by Edison, merged their companies and formed a cartel, the Motion Picture Patents Company (the "MPPC").9 At first, the MPPC
wielded its power by pooling all of the licenses and patents that its
individual members held,"0 and it defended its position by bringing

4. See infra notes 89-183 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 184-225 and accompanying text.
6. See ROBERT H. STANLEY, THE CELLULOID EMPIRE 1-49 (1978); see also IZOD,
supra note 2, at 1-7.
7.

See MICHAEL CONANT, ANTITRUST IN THE MOTION PIcTuRE INDUSTRY 16-17

(1960); see also IZOD, supra note 2, 'at 1-38; Cassady, supra note 1, at 153.
8. Patents were held for the raw film and cameras needed to make motion pictures and

for the projectors that were needed to exhibit them. As technology in the motion picture
business was still in a pre-industrialized stage, ownership of these patents gave Edison and
his contemporaries an opportunity to control the entire business. These individuals defended
their power vigorously by bringing a continuum of lawsuits against anyone who infringed on
any of their patent rights. See e.g., Edison v. American Mutoscop & Biograph Co., 151 Fed.
767 (2d Cir. 1907); Edison v. American Mutoscope & Biograph Co., 144 Fed. 121
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1906); American Mutoscope & Biograph Co. v. Edison Mfg. Co., 137 Fed.
262 (C.C.D.N.J. 1905); Edison v. American Mutoscope & Biograph Co., 127 Fed. 361
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904); Armat v. Edison, 125 Fed. 939 (2d Cir. 1903); Edison v. Lubin, 122
Fed. 240 (3d Cir. 1903); Edison v. American Mutoscope & Biograph Co., 114 Fed. 926 (2d
Cir. 1902). For a thorough discussion of the use of law suits to defend these patents, see
IZOD, supra note 2, at 1-6.
9. The members of the MPPC were: Biograph, Edison, Essanay, Gaumont, Kalem,
Lubin, M61i6s, Path6 Frares, Selig, and Vitagraph. For a detailed study of the history of the
MPPC, see Ralph Cassady, Jr., Monopoly in Motion Picture Production and Distribution:
1908-1915, 32 S. CAL L. REV. 325, 329-50 (1959).
10. See RAISE V. JENKINS, IMAGES AND ENTERPRISE: TECHNOLOGY AND THE AMERICAN

PHOTOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY 1839 TO 1925, 285 (1975). The trust operated by licensing its
patents to exhibitors on the condition that these exhibitors not use machinery and materials
on or together with the machinery and materials that the MPPC had licensed.
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numerous lawsuits against those who infringed on their rights." At
the same time, motion picture exchanges developed 2 to distribute
the movies that the MPPC was producing. These exchanges became
quite profitable and as they cultivated, the MPPC "initiated forward
vertical integration"13 by purchasing most of the major exchanges in
the nation."4 As the MPPC appropriated exchanges, they instituted
practices that were designed to increase their bargaining power and
their ability to control the exhibitors who needed their product. Using
their patents to force compliance from exhibitors, the MPPC imposed
restrictions on these exhibitors which included using a system of distribution based on runs,' 5 zones, 16 and clearances. 17 The MPPC's
successful control over distribution was short-lived though. It came to
an end with the first motion picture antitrust action," which was ini-

11. See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 235 F. 398
(1916), aff'd, 243 U.S. 502 (1917); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Independent Motion
Pictures Co., 200 F. 411 (2d Cir. 1912); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Laemmle, 186 F. 641
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Champion Film Co., 183 F. 986
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Laemmle, 178 F. 104 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1910); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Ullman, 186 F. 174 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910); Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. New York Motion Picture Co., 174 F. 51 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1909).
12. Motion picture exchanges were the first attempt at organized distribution. They
pooled pictures from many different producers and distributed them to theaters across their
region. See CONANT, supra note 7, at 18.
13. See JENKINS, supra note 10, at 287. With vertical integration a company acquires
the firms above and below it on the production line. In the motion picture industry, vertical
integration refers to one company that produces, distributes and exhibits films. PAUL SOLMAN
& THOmS FRIEDMAN, LIFE AND DEATH ON THE CORPORATE BATTEFIEID-HOW COMPANIES WIN, LosE, SURvIVE 84 (1982).
14. These acquisitions were made by the General Film Company. The General Film
Company was a licensee of the MPPC and was operated by members of the MPPC. The
company was created specifically for the purpose of acquiring exchanges. See Cassady, supra
note 9, at 355-59; see also IZOD, supra note 2, at 18; JENKINS, supra note 10, at 287.
15. See infra note 2.
16. "Zones" are geographic boundaries. Within each zone a distributor would only
release a particular motion picture to one theater for exhibition. This practice ensures that the
distributor will obtain the largest audience for a film and it prevents other theaters in close
proximity from competing for the same customers who might wish to see the particular
movie. See MAE DENA HUETrIG, ECONOMIC CONTROL. OF THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY
125 (1944). Giving preference to MPPC-licensed exhibitors through the use of overly broad
zones would prohibit nonmember exhibitors from the competition for audience dollars.
17. "Clearance" relates to the amount of time that, by contract, must elapse between the
end of the first run of a motion picture and the beginning of its subsequent runs. Longer
clearances provide more first run revenues for a picture. If a clearance is long enough, a
picture will have no subsequent run value. See Cassady, supra note 1, at 334 n.49. With the
reduction in subsequent run value, those exhibitors which showed later runnings of a film
were effectively put out of business.
18. United States v. Motion Picture Patents Co., 225 F. 800 (E.D. Pa. 1915), appeal
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tiated by the head of one of the few exchanges that the MPPC did
not operate.19 This case stripped the trust of its power by holding
that the defendants had used their patents to unreasonably restrain
trade. As a result of their use of unreasonable restrictions, the defendants had "monopolized a large part of the interstate commerce in
films, cameras, projecting machines, and other articles of commerce
accessory to the motion picture business."20 The trust was terminated
because they could no longer use their patents to impose undue restrictions. As one commentator has explained, "a patent owner could
not extend the scope of the patent by restricting the use to materials
for the operation but forming no part of the patented invennecessary
1

tion."

2

Although this decision brought an end to the MPPC, it was not
successful in curtailing the control that motion picture producers and
distributors had by now gained. From the ashes of the MPPC arose
the first attempt at a national distribution system, and this eventually
led to the first fully integrated studio, Paramount Pictures Corporation
("Paramount").2 Paramount, as a producer, had contracts with many
of the most popular film stars.2 They were able to use the box office appeal of their stars, 24 together with their new national distribution capabilities, to create a new mechanism for control, block booking.' While Paramount was a dominant force in the industry, other
dismissed by stipulation, 247 U.S. 524 (1918) (defendant was found to have engaged in
unreasonable restraint of trade and to have monopolized commerce in films, cameras, projectors,
and accessories).
19. See IZOD, supra note 2, at 25.
20. Motion Picture Patent Co., 225 F. at 811.
21. Charles H. Grant, Anti-Competitive Practices in the Motion Picture Industry and
Judicial Support of Anti-Blind Bidding Statutes, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 349, 352
(1989).

22. At this time, film distribution was accomplished by either individual producers
taking a motion picture to different theaters around the country or by exchanges distributing
pictures in separate markets around the country. Paramount was initially formed by W.W.
Hodskin with the hopes of becoming a national distributor of films. See IZOD, supra note 2,
at 45. In 1916, Paramount merged with Adolph Zukor's Famous Players company to become
the first company involved in production and national distribution. Thus, the first studio was
formed. See Simon N. Whitney, Antitrust Policies and the Motion Picture Industry, in THE
AMERICAN MOvIE INDUSTRY: THE BUSINESS OF MOTION PICTURES 163 (Gorham Kindem ed.
1982) [hereinafter THE AMERICAN MOvIE INDUSTRY].

23. See Gorham Kindem, Hollywood's Movie Star System. A Historical Overview, in
THE AMERICAN MOVIE INDUSTRY, supra note 22, at 82-83.
24. See Cassady, supra note 1, at 154-55.
25. Block booking is the practice of licensing, or offering for license, one feature, or
group of features, upon condition that the exhibitor also license another feature, or group of
features, released by the distributor during a given period. See United States v. Paramount
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companies also gained controlling interests by engaging in similar
practices.2 6 Needless to say, block booking along with the now well
established run-zone-clearance system27 angered the exhibitors who
were forced to suffer the consequences of their use. In response to
these practices, and in an attempt to gain some bargaining power in
the industry, exhibitors began to join together to form chains and circuits. 28 By 1917, the First National Exhibitors Circuit was formed.
This was the first national merger of high quality first run theaters.2 9
"Circuit booking, as it came to be called, became a recognized method of defense on the part of exhibitors against the dominant producers."30
By the 1920s, these circuits had gained substantial market domination by engaging in anti-competitive practices of their own.31 As a
natural consequence of the power that these circuits had gained, "control of these cinemas meant control of the [entire] industry, and they
became targets for purchase by the big producers."32 The studio's
purchasing was influenced by the realization that if they could control
every level in the motion picture industry, from production down to
exhibition, they would not only be able to control prices and ensure
access to screens for the exhibition of their own pictures,33 but they
would also be able to prevent competition from small independent
producers and thus gain complete control over the entire industry.
As the studios continued to purchase exhibitors, they began to engage
in practices that were designed to make this complete control a reali-

Pictures, 66 F. Supp. 323, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). Block booking ensures outlets for a motion
picture regardless of its quality or box office potential. As Paramount had the stars that
theater owners wanted, they were forced to take Paramount's less popular pictures if they
were to hope to have any of the popular ones. Id, see also JENKINS, supra note 10, at 294.
26. These other "principal concerns" were: First National, Fox, Metro (controlled by
Loew's, Inc.), Path6, United Artists, Universal, Vitagraph, and Warner Brothers. See Cassady,
supra note 1, at 155.
27. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text; see also IZOD supra note 2, at 40.
28. See IZOD, supra note 2, at 48-49; JENKINS, supra note 10, at 294; Whitney, supra
note 22, at 163.
29. See Gerald E. Phillips, The Recent Acquisition of Theater Circuits by Major Distributors, 5 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 2 (1987).
30. HUEMrG, supra note 16, at 22.
31. Many circuits were eventually charged with violating the Sherman Act. See infra
note 36; see also HUETTIG, supra note 16, at 22-23 (describing the case of the Stanley
Booking Corporation of Philadelphia).
32. See IZOD, supra note 2, at 40-41.
33. See Cassady, supra note 1, at 156.
34. See CONANT, supra note 7, at 37 ("By monopolizing the final marketing outlet they
[the majors] successfully curtailed entry by independent producers.").
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ty. These activities included giving exhibition preferences to their own
pictures and to those of the other major studios by using extended
clearances, creating overly broad zones for affiliated exhibitors, and
refusing to exhibit pictures produced by independent producers. With
such policies and preferential practices quickly becoming the rule in
the industry, and studio owned circuits gaining command over entire
exhibition markets, the government began an attempt at interven35
tion.
The government's response to these practices came in the form
of numerous law suits and court cases brought against both the circuits and the distributors.' Two of the most notable attacks 37 were
the government's antitrust charges brought against distributors and
exhibitors in both the Los Angeles' and Chicago39 markets. These
suits charged the defendants with illegally restraining trade by adopting various anti-competitive practices including the use of arbitrary
clearances, discriminatory zoning methods, and block booking. Although the government succeeded in forcing the defendants to sign
consent decrees restricting their conduct, 4 they ultimately lost the
battle. These cases, like their predecessors, had very little effect on
curtailing the growing anti-competitive atmosphere that, by this time,

35. See k at 43-57.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith Amusement Co., 68 F. Supp 180 (W.D. Okla.
1946), rev'd 334 U.S. 100 (1948); United States v. Schine Chain Theaters, Inc., 63 F. Supp.
229 (W.D.N.Y. 1945), a.ffd in part and rev'd in part, 334 U.S. 110 (1948); United States v.
Crescent Amusement Co., 31 F. Supp. 730 (M.D. Tenn. 1940), affid in part and rev'd in
part, 323 U.S. 173 (1944); United States v. Interstate Circuit, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 868 (N.D.
Tex. 1937), remanded, 304 U.S. 55 (1938), af'd, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); United States v. First
Nat'l Pictures, Inc., 34 F.2d 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), rev'd, 282 U.S. 44 (1930); see also Whitney, supra note 22, at 168.
37. In addition to these two cases, the governments suit against the Paramount Famous
Lasky studio was as equally well-known. This suit charged the defendants with the use of
nefarious arbitration practices and unfair penalties when dealing with independent theaters. The
use of these practices was found to be a violation of the Sherman Act. See United States v.
Paramount Famous Lasky Corp., 34 F.2d 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), aff'd 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
38. See United States v. Fox West Coast Theaters, 1932-1939 Trade Cas. (CCH)
55,018 (S.D. Cal. 1932).
39. See United States v. Balaban & Katz Corp., 1932-1939 Trade Cas. (CCH) I 55,001
(N.D. III. 1932).
40. See supra notes 38-39. The Fox decree enjoined the defendants from the use of
certain alleged unfair discriminations in the method of zoning theaters for exhibition of
motion pictures. The Balaban & Katz decree enjoined the defendants from: (1) granting
unreasonable clearances; (2) restraining unaffiliated theaters from contracting for fust run
pictures; (3) acquiring the management or booking control, without a substantial proprietary
interest, of motion picture theaters; and (4) leasing more first run pictures than is reasonably
necessary for the conduct of their respective businesses.
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had taken over the industry.4 1
By the end of the 1930s, with its laissez-faire attitude, the majority of the most powerful circuits had been purchased by the major
studios.4 2 Blatantly anti-competitive activity became the norm in the
industry, and as a result, the government rejuvenated its attempts at
curtailing these practices. The Justice Department started to bring
more lawsuits in an attempt to enjoin the monopolistic activities of
these circuits, 43 and in 1938 finally took a major step in seeking to
end the now rampant activity. In 1938, after "15 years of intensive
investigation," the government, with the conviction that it had a
strong enough case against the nation's leading motion picture studios,"5 filed the Paramount case.
The suit against the predominant motion picture studios was
brought under § 4 of the Sherman Act.' The defendants were divided into three groups and were classified as either "major" or "minor"
defendants.47 The major defendants were Loew's, Inc., Paramount
Pictures, Inc., Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp., and Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., all of whom produced,
distributed, and exhibited motion pictures.4 8 The minor defendants
were Columbia Pictures Corp. and Universal Corp. both of whom
produced and distributed motion pictures, and United Artists Corp.,
which only distributed motion pictures. Only the major defendants
owned or controlled motion picture theaters. "The complaint charged
that the producer defendants had attempted to monopolize and had
monopolized the production of motion pictures." 9 Furthermore, the
complaint charged that all of the defendants had attempted to and did
constrain and monopolize interstate trade in the distribution and exhibition of motion pictures."

41. See Cassady, supra note 1, at 156.
42. See CONANT, supra note 7, at 82.
43. See, e.g., Schine Chain Theaters v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948); United
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S.
173 (1944); United States v. Interstate Circuit Inc., 20 F. Supp. 868 (N.D. Tex. 1937).
44. STANLEY, supra note 6, at 113.
45. Cassady, supra note 1, at 157.
46. 29 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)).
47. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. at 329-30. For the purposes
of this Note, all the defendants will be referred to as the "Paramount defendants," unless
otherwise specified.
48. Id.
49. id.
50. See Cassady, supra note 1, at 157. The major defendants had to give preferential
treatment to the minor defendants because the majors could not produce enough motion
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Before the case came to trial, the government yielded to pressure
from the studios, and the major defendants were allowed to settle
with the government by signing a consent decree on November 20,
1940."1 The government, relying on the faith of the defendants to
curtail their past behavior and the strength of the decree to put an
end to the illegal activities that had taken over the industry, further
backed away from taking a strong stance by providing for the expiration of the decree after only a three year period.52 Specifically, the
decree enjoined the consenting defendants as follows: (1) block booking was limited to no more than five pictures; (2) blind bidding53
was prohibited; (3) the use of unreasonable clearances was prohibited;
(4) forced rentals were abolished; (5) limits were placed on the rights
of distributors to refuse to license motion pictures to exhibitors; and
(6) the defendants were prohibited from engaging in a "general program of theater acquisition."' The decree also created an arbitration
board that was designed to resolve disputes arising between independent theater owners and the Paramount defendants. 55 This decree,
like the ones before it, was unsuccessful in bringing about change in
the industry because the government did not demand the separation of
production and distribution from exhibition. The arbitration board
proved to be unsuccessful, and other regulations were unhelpful. At
the expiration of the decree's three year life, affiliated circuits still
controlled exhibition, and independent production had gained no ad56
vances.
Determined to free up trade and create competition by eliminating the monopolistic strangle hold that the Paramount defendants still
maintained, the Justice Department, late in the summer of 1944, reactivated the Paramount case and asked the District Court for the
Southern District of New York to impose all of the remedies of the

pictures to completely fill their screens and they needed the product that the minors could
provide. See IZOD, supra note 2, at 86.
51.

United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1940-1943 Trade Cas. (CCH)

56,072

(S.D.N.Y. 1940).
52. Id.However, the government reserved the right to reinstate the case at the expiration of the three year period. Id. at 298.
53. Blind bidding is the practice whereby a motion picture distributor requires exhibitors
to bid on the licensing or rental of a motion picture without first having an opportunity to
view the film. See Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 433 (S.D.
Ohio 1980), afrd in part, remanded on other grounds, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
54. See Paramount, 1940-1943 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 56,072, at 289-94.
55. Id.
56. See CONANT, supra note 7, at 97.
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amended complaint with specific emphasis placed on forcing the divestiture of the theaters by the defendants.'7 By that point in time,
the Paramount defendants had gained control over 17.35% of the
nation's theaters." This seemingly small percentage of ownership
masked the reality that the defendants controlled 90% of the most
significant theaters in the major markets around the country. 9 This
control of prime exhibition coupled with the fact that at the same
time the defendants distributed 75% of all pictures in this country,'
is demonstrative evidence that the Paramount defendants had fully
attained their long-term goal to completely control the distribution
market for first run motion pictures in the United States.61
It was under these conditions that the court reacted. Although the
district court62 did not find that the major defendants had monopolized production in the industry, the did find that the distribution
system then used by the defendants was restraining trade and was
resulting in numerous violations of the Sherman Act.63 Pursuant to
its decision, the court went on to issue a decree in December
1946.' The decree prohibited many of the complained of activities
such as: the use of excessive zones and clearances, forced block
booking, fixing admission prices, expansion in theater ownership, and
joint theater ownership by the defendants or between any defendant
and an independent theater owner. However, the remedy of divorcing
motion picture exhibition from production and distribution, as requested by the government, was found to be unnecessary.65 As an alternative remedy for correcting the illegal distribution system then in

57. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); see

134.
also, STANLEY, supra note 6, at

58. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 53, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1946)
(finding 118).
59. See CONANT, supra note 7, at 82.
60. Id.
61. See Paramount,70 F. Supp. at 70-71 (findings 146-51). By filling 90% of the best
theaters with 75% of the movies that they exhibited, the studios had blocked access to
independent producers and distributors and had effectively eliminated competition for audience
dollars from non-affiliated theaters.
62. In actuality, the case was originally tried before a three judge expediting courL See
United States v. Loew's, Inc., 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,553 at 76,951 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
see also infra note 67.
63. Paramount, 70 F. Supp. 53 (findings of fact and conclusions of law); Paramount,
66 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
57,526
64. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1946-1947 Trade Cas. (CCH)
(S.D.N.Y. 1946).
65. Paramount,66 F. Supp. at 353.
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place, the court mandated that a system of competitive bidding in
each run be instituted, which would be open to all theaters.'
On appeal to the Supreme Court,67 most of the lower court rulings relating to the illegality of trade practices carried on by the defendants were affirmed." As for the remedy to be applied, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's mandate of instituting a
competitive bidding procedure. The Court found that this was not a
workable solution,' and that such a system "involves the judiciary
so deeply in the daily operation of this nation-wide business and
promises such dubious benefits that it should not be undertaken."'
The Court seemed to be more concerned with vertical integration, and
instead of the bidding system, it ordered that on remand the district
court begin anew in considering whether or not the remedy of theater
divestiture was a more appropriate remedy.7 1
On remand from the Supreme Court, and before any further
hearings in the case, RKO and Paramount consented to decrees divorcing their theater circuits and divesting certain theaters from the
circuits,' By voluntarily signing decrees before a final finding in the
case, both defendants were able to obtain more favorable terms in
their decrees than were the remaining major defendants. 3 As for the
remaining six defendants, the final decision as to their fate was filed

66. Id.
67. Appeal to the Supreme Court was direct from the district court because the case
was brought under § 2 of the Expediting Act of February 11, 1903, 32 U.S. Stat. 823. See
United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 140 n.1 (1948). The Expediting Act was
enacted in order to allow the Attorney General to seek expeditious treatment for cases, of
general public importance, that were brought under the Sherman Act. HANS B. THORELUl,
THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST Poucy: ORGANIZATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADmoN 537 (1954).
68. Paramount, 334 U.S. 131.
69. See STANLEY, supra note 6, at 135.
70. Paramount,334 U.S. at 162
71. Paramount,334 U.S. at 166-75. The Court did not accept the government's contention that vertical integration was illegal per se. The Court set forth a two part test for
determining whether vertical integration was illegal under the Sherman Act. This test turned
on "(1) the purpose or intent with which it was conceived, or (2) the power it creates and
the attendant purpose or intent." Id. at 174-75.
72. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 1948-1949 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,377
(S.D.N.Y. 1949) (Paramount Consent Decree); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 1948-1949
Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,335 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (RKO Consent Decree). It should be noted that
within all of the decrees that were issued, the court used the term "divorcement" to refer to
the required separation by the defendants of exhibition from production and distribution. The
court used the term 'divestment" to refer to the selling off of theaters by the circuits.
73. After the divorcement of their exhibition businesses, neither company was required
to obtain the permission of the court before reentering the motion picture exhibition business.
See RKO and Paramount consent decrees, supra note 72.
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on July 25, 1949.74
The district court held, as a matter of law, that the defendants

had conspired to and had restrained trade in the distribution and exhibition of motion pictures. The court concluded that vertical integrations were "a definite means of carrying out the restraints and conspiracies" that were found to be illegal and in restraint of trade. 75 As
a remedy, the court found that the divorcement of exhibition from
production-distribution was necessary in order to free up trade.7 6 On
the basis of its decision, the district court issued a final decree
against the three major defendants that had not yet signed decrees,
and against the three minor defendants.' The decree, as to the exhibitor defendants, was later supplemented with new decrees outlining
the details of their divorcement and theater divestiture.7"
The final result to arise from the government's long-pursued case
was that all of the named defendants were forced to end their illegal
conduct and were required to begin licensing motion pictures on a
picture-by-picture basis, solely upon the merits and without discrimination in favor of affiliated theaters, circuit theaters, or others. 9 Furthermore, and equally as important, the decrees provided the government with their requested remedy of the divestiture of specific theaters as well as the divorcement of theater circuits by the major defendants."0 This mandate forced the defendants to divorce theater
ownership from their control by creating independent "theater" and
"picture" companies that would be separately owned and which were
strictly prohibited from attempting to influence one another's conduct."1 The new picture companies that were created could only en-

74. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), aff'd
per curiam, 339 U.S. 974 (1950).
75. Paramount,85 F. Supp. at 893.
76. Id. at 896.
77. United States v. Loew's Inc., 1950-1951 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,573 (S.D.N.Y
1950).
78. United States v. Loew's Inc., 1952-1953 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 67,228 (S.D.N.Y
1952) (Loew's Consent Decree); United States v. Loew's Inc., 1950 Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,765 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (Warner Consent Decree); United States v. Loew's Inc., 1950-1951
Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,861 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (Twentieth Century-Fox Consent Decree).
79. See, e.g., Loew's, 1950 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,573, 63,681-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
80. See STANLEY, supra note 6, at 135.
81. See, e.g., Loews, 1950-1951 Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,765, at 64,273 (Warner Consent Judgement). As a result of the divorcement requirement, Paramount split into Paramount
Pictures Corporation and United Paramount Theaters, and RICO separated into RKO Pictures
Corporation and RKO Theaters Corporation. M-G-M sold its theaters to Loew's, Inc. Twentieth Century-Fox sold its theaters to National Theaters, Inc. Warner Brothers's theaters were
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ter the exhibition business, and the new theater companies that were
created could only enter the distribution business after petitioning the
court, and "upon showing that any such engagement shall not unreasonably restrain competition in the distribution or exhibition of motion pictures."' Furthermore, the new theater companies could only
acquire additional theaters in the limited situations outlined in the
decrees, or with the court's consent after showing that such acquisition would not restrain competition. 3
Fourteen years after the original proceedings had begun, the government had finally succeeded in loosening the grip that the studios
had long held over the entire industry. By eliminating the domination
of vertically integrated studios, the hold over motion picture distribution was sufficiently weakened to give independent producers access
to screens and a chance to prosper in the industry. The number of
independent producers 4 skyrocketed from 70 in 1946 to almost 170
in 1957.5 As early as 1953, the Justice Department found that the
decrees had helped start to bring about arms length dealing in the
industry.8 6 "After Paramount, competitive bidding and competitive
negotiations became the predominant method of film licensing."87
Independent theaters were also given a chance to compete equally for
the right to exhibit first run movies. 8
II.

DEREGULATION UNDER REAGAN

Although in the ensuing years suits were brought alleging viola-

acquired by the Stanley Warner Corporation. See Grant, supra note 21, at 361.
82. Loew's, 1950-1951 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,765, at 64,273 (Warner Consent Judgment).
83. Id. at 64,266.
84. The independence of these producers is debatable, as they still needed the studios to
aid in the financing and distribution of their films. See STANLEY, supra note 6, at 144.
85. See CONANT, supra note 7, at 113.
86. See id. at 110 ("In spite of the slow progress of divorcement and the continued
family interrelationships, the facts seem to support a finding that divorcement has been
effective. The production-distribution firms deal at arm's length with their former circuits.
This was the conclusion of the Justice Department in 1953.").
87. William J. Bomer, Note, Motion Picture Split Agreements: An Antitrust Analysis, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 159, 164 (1983).
88. Although the independent exhibitors had the opportunity to compete, many were hurt
by divorcement and divestiture. Studios no longer distributed as many films and competition
for the highest quality motion pictures increased with competitive bidding. As a result, many
individual theaters were put out of business. See SUZANNE M. DONAHUE, AMERICAN FILM
DISTRIBUTION: THE CHANGING MARKETPLACE 35 (1987); Grant, supra note 21, at 361;
Whitney, supra note 22, at 174.
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tions of the Sherman Act by both distributors and exhibitors, 9 it
was not until Ronald Reagan took over as President of the United
States in 1980 that the studios were once again allowed to become
vertically integrated and swallow up the exhibition market in the
United States. As President Reagan moved his belongings into his
new residence on Pennsylvania Avenue, this country was about to
enter what has been called one of the greatest periods of deregulation
and "nonenforcement" of the antitrust laws since the 1930s.90 Reagan brought with him the desire to bring about vast legislative reform9 ' by instituting a traditional laissez-faire attitude that was designed to "reduce the government's role in business." 92 As Reagan
had the opportunity to shape the Justice Department by appointing
new Assistant Attorneys General, it became apparent that the
Administration's policy of promoting free competition was one of
"narrowing rather than expanding the scope of antitrust laws."93
Reagan's first Assistant Attorney General, William Baxter, 4 has
been described as having as one of his agendas, the "trivialization of
the dominant antitrust thinking."" It is claimed that he pictures this
dominant thinking as "wrongheaded, fuzzy, unworkable, protectionist,
and perverse." 6

89. See infra notes 206-18 and accompanying text (relating to block booking and split
agreements).
90. Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective:
Where are We Coming From? Where are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936, 941-42
(1987). This earlier period of nonenforcement was demonstrated by the government's lack of
prosecution of the Paramount defendants in the 1930s. See supra section .
91. See 60 Minutes With Douglas Ginsburg, Assistant Attorney General Antitrust
Division, 55 ANTITRUST L. 255, 260 (1986) [hereinafter Ginsburg] (when asked what his
personal priorities were as Assistant Attorney General, he replied, -legislative reform, legislative reform, legislative reform"). This desire to bring about change should not be seen as
unusual. Every administration has used litigation to implement their policies. See Thomas J.
Campbell, The Antitrust Record of the First Reagan Administration, 64 TEX. L. REV. 353,
354 (1985).
92. See Fox & Sullivan, supra note 90, at 944-45.
93. Campbell, supra note 91, at 353.
94. Baxter served as Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division from 1981 to
1984. As an arm of the executive branch of the government, the enforcement policies of the
Department of Justice "reflect closely the current views of the administration in power on
antitrust policing." See JERROLD G. VAN Cisp, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUsT LAws 43 (1975).
95. Fox & Sullivan, supra note 90, at 945.
96. Id. Most commentators will agree that antitrust enforcement has become obfuscated,
see also generally Nolan E. Clark, Antitrust Comes Full Circle: The Return to the Cartelization Standard, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1125 (1985) (noting that "for decades, Sherman Act
doctrines have been murky and confused"); William L. Letwin, Congress and the Sherman
Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. Cm. L. REV. 221, 222 (1956) (stating that "[it should not
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Under Reagan, the long adhered to traditional concerns that
helped Congress shape this nation's first antitrust law, the Sherman
Act, 97 were cast aside9 in favor of an alternative school of
thought." No longer was the main emphasis placed on the fear that

be surprising ... that although the Sherman Act was passed by a virtually unanimous vote,
and although its language is disarmingly clear, the administration and courts charged with
enforcing it have experienced too much difficulty in settling its meaning").
97. There is a significant debate about the legislative history of the Sherman Act, what
Congress's purpose was in passing it, and how it should now be applied. This Note does not
attempt to present a detailed description of the differing opinions; it only relates the approach
to antitrust taken by the Reagan Administration.
The "traditional view" refers simply to the feeling that all forms of competitive
restraints that hurt small businesses or consumers deserve some legislative and judicial
scrutiny on a fact sensitive basis. See John J. Flynn, The "Is" and "Ought" of Vertical
Restraints after Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 71 CORNN.L L. REV. 1095 (1986).
In the words of two commentators:
[A]ntitrust traditionally had two central concerns. The first was political-distrust of
bigness and of fewness of competitors as well as a policy preference for diversity
and opportunity for the unestablished. The second was socioeconomic, especially as
seen from the vantage point of the small businessperson and the consumer. Antitrust set fair rules for the competitive game. What mattered was getting a fair shot
as an entrepreneur, and having choice and receiving a fair deal as a consumer.
Fox & Sullivan, supra note 90, at 944.
The Reagan Administration's view runs afoul of these traditional concerns and is
described infra, note 99. Other commentators argue that because antitrust laws were passed to
eliminate trusts, that purpose should be the only goal of enforcement today. See Clark, supra
note 96. Lastly, there is also support from some commentators for a total repeal of all antitrust laws. See DOMINICK T. ARMENTANO, ANTmUsT POuCY, THE CASE FOR REPEAL x-xi
(1986).
98. In the words of one author.
Traditional antitrust policy has collapsed like a house of cards. In just 10
years-an extremely short time in matters of such importance-the antitrust regulatory authorities have gone from an enthusiastic enforcement of traditional antitrust
policy in the mid-1970s to a substantial rejection of much of the conventional
approach in the mid-1980s.
ARMENTANO, supra note 97, at ix.
99. See Robert Pitofsky, Does Antitrust Have a Future, 76 GEo. L.J. 321, 323 (1981);
see also William E. Kovacic, Reagan's Judicial Appointees and Antitrust in the 1990s, 60
FORDHAM L. REv. 49, 54 (1990).
The Administration's conservative view is known by many names; it has been termed
.neoclassical," "economic efficiency" and of course "Chicago School." See LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrrRUST 376 n.1 (1977); Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 13 (1984); Flynn, supra note 97, at
1095 & 1132.
The basic tenets of this theory is to apply rigid economic models, as opposed to
making fact sensitive determinations, when analyzing merger activity. See Flynn, supra note
97, at 1125-42. But see Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV.
1696 (1986) (arguing that the Chicago School does not blindly follow economic models). The
end result of this approach is to favor most forms of collaborative conduct. See infra notes
121-27 and accompanying text. Judge Posner summed up the results of this school of
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big businesses were fencing out competitors from access to markets,
and big business leaders were depriving the little man of a fair
chance to participate in the governance of business.'ro
The Reagan Administration's neoclassical approach to antitrust
law believed in a perfect market and favored applying strict models
of economic efficiency that left no room for the realities of day to
day occurrences." 1 This view favored most forms of collaboration
because it felt that they aided efficiency,"° apparently ignoring potential harms that might befall consumers. 3 While this view of antitrust law still favored attacking the most severe anti-competitive
practices, 4 it proposed the adoption of a softened stance when analyzing most types of merger activity. 5
The Administration used many tools'06 to accomplish its re-

thoughtThe welfare of a particular competitor who may be hurt as the result of some
trade practice is the concern not of the federal antitrust laws . . . but of state
unfair competition law. ....

The exclusion of competitors is cause for antitrust concern only if it impairs the health of the competitive process itself.
Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Industries, 749 F.2d 380, 394 (7th Cir. 1984) (citations
omitted).
100. See THORELLI, supra note 67, at 226. ("The government's natural role in the system
of free private enterprise was that of a patrolman policing the highways of commerce. It is
the duty of the modem patrolman to keep the road open for all and everyone and to prevent . . . [all types of] violations that will endanger and hence, in the end, slow down the
overall movement of the traffic.").
101. See Eddie Correia, Antitrust Policy after the Reagan Administration, 76 GEo. L.J.
329, 335 (1987); Pitofsky, supra note 99, at 322-23. But see Charles F. Rule & David L.
Meyer, Toward a Merger Policy that Maximizes Consumer Welfare: Enforcement by Careful
Analysis, not by the Numbers, 35 ANTITRUST LJ. 251 (1990) (arguing that non-quantitative
factors are taken into consideration when analyzing the competitive effects of mergers under
the Reagan Administration's approach).
102. See Flynn, supra note 97, at 1101; Ginsburg, supra note 91, at 262; Malcolm R.
Pfunder, Antitrust Law Developments 1989-1990: Developments in Merger Law and Enforcement 1989-1990, 59 ANTIRUST L.J 319, 324 (1990).
103. See generally Flynn, supra note 97, at 1125-42 (suggesting that the economic
analysis approach overlooks potential harms to consumers, including increased prices, and thus
allows many mergers to proceed that should be prevented).
104. See infira notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
106. This note focuses 'on three of the "routes" used by the Administration: (1) the
issuance of guidelines, (2) "enforcement discretion," and (3) the use of amidi curiae briefs in
attempting to influence jurisprudence. See Campbell, supra note 91.
Another approach that Reagan used to effectuate his desired policy aims was the use
of judicial appointments. Some commentators argue that the toning down of federal antitrust
policy should be "substantially attributed to their efforts." See Kovacic, supra note 99, at 49.
Although court packing was not a novel tool in shaping policy, Reagan raised its use
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shaping of historic antitrust restrictions. One tool that was used to
promulgate change was the issuance of guidelines' °7 that were designed to give practicing attorneys a guide to the Administration's
policies when pursuing possible merger activity, and forewarn them as
to when the Department was likely to challenge a merger.'0 8
While the basic tenets of these guidelines still seemed to support
traditional -concerns about consumer welfare,"° other concerns were
abandoned. Horizontal restraints,"° in their purest form, were still
looked at as being per se illegal;.' however, vertical restraints,"'
once thought to reduce competition and foster illegal monopolistic
structures," were now often thought to aid competition and help
the economic environment." 4 Even more astonishing, this conservative approach to antitrust thinking adopted the view that the regulation of vertical restraints would actually harm consumers. 5
These guidelines were not met with open arms by all of those in

to new levels. Id.; see also ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STEDHAM, THE FEDERAL COURTS
111 (2d ed. 1991).
107. Of all of the guidelines issued by the Administration, three are most pertinent to
this Note: (1) U.S. Dep't of Justice 1982 Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493 (June 30,
1982); (2) U.S. Dep't of Justice 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,827 (June 29,
1984); and (3) U.S. Dep't of Justice Vertical Restraint Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. 6263 (Feb.
14, 1985).
108. See Ginsburg, supra note 91, at 267; U.S. Dept. of Justice 1984 Merger Guidelines,
49 Fed. Reg. 26,827, 26,828 (1984).
109. See Fox & Sullivan, supra note 90, at 953; Ginsburg, supra note 91, at 270.
110. Horizontal restraints exist where competitors conspire with each other to set prices,
restrain trade through combined control, and generally eliminate competition from outside
companies. See SULLIVAN, supra note 99, at 150-329.
111. See Campbell, supra note 91, at 362; Flynn, supra note 97, at 1101; Pitovsky,
supra note 99, at 321; see also ARMENTANO, supra note 97, at 4 ("Antitrust in the 1980s is
still ...
very much concerned with price-fixing and market division agreements between
competitors (horizontal agreements), and neither the antitrust authorities nor the courts have
relaxed their position that such arrangements are normally illegal per se."); Kovacic, supra
note 99, at 63 (noting that "the Reagan Antitrust Division mounted an unprecedented program
to detect and prosecute horizontal price fixing").
112. "Vertical restraints are arrangements between firms operating at different levels of
the manufacturing or distribution chain (for example, between a manufacturer and a wholesaler or a wholesaler and a retailer) that restrict the conditions under which firms may purchase,
sell, or resell." Department of Justice Vertical Restraint Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. 6263, 6264
(1985). See Sullivan, supra note 99, at 376.
113. See Fruehauf Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm., 603 F.2d 345, 353 (2d Cir. 1979); see
also supra section L
114. See Clark, supra note 96, at 1167; Kovacic, supra note 99, at 65 (noting that, "[t]o
conservative antitrust scholars, vertical restraints almost invariably serve desirable efficiency
ends").
115. See Campbell, supra note 91, at 369.
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the legal community.116 The biggest opponent of the vertical restraint guidelines was possibly Congress itself, which did not believe
that the courts should view them as persuasive. Feeling that the
guidelines were "inconsistent with the congressional purpose in adopting antitrust laws,"117 and that they were not an accurate representation of the law, Congress asked the Justice Department to withdraw
them."' The Administration respectfully declined.119
Another tool that the Administration used to infuse its reformulated and toned down interpretation of antitrust law into the nation
was "enforcement discretion," as so eloquently termed by Professor
Campbell. ° Gone was the fear that large scale mergers might substantially lessen competition;12 large conglomerates were now
thought to bolster both economic efficiency and competition."n As a
result, the Administration's softened stance on anti-competitive practices influenced all types of large scale mergers and corporate restructuring."n For example, the 3001 mergers in 1986, which broke a
thirteen-year record124 were easily surpassed by the 3487 mergers in
1988.125 Of 'the majority of challenges that were brought against

116. See, e.g., NAAG Adopts Alternate Guidelines to Govern Vertical Restraints of Trade,
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1243, at 978 (Dec. 5, 1985) (finding that the
Department of Justice's guidelines are an inaccurate reflection of law); Lawrence A. Sullivan,
The Justice Department Guidelines on Mergers and Vertical Restraints: A Critique, 16
ANTITRUST L. & EcoN. REv. 11, 18 (1984) ("In all of these respects the guidelines are

inconsistent with existing law and are also demonstrably unsound as a matter of policy.").
117. See Flynn, supra note 97, at 1147.
118.

See HoUsE JUDICIARY COMMITEE, VERTICAL RESTRAINT GUIDELINES RESOLUTION,

H.R. 399, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Ginsburg, supra note 91, at 267; see also infra notes
139-40 and accompanying text.
119. See Ginsburg, supra note 91, at 267.
120. See Campbell, supra note 91, at 361-64.
121. According to then Assistant Attorney General Douglas Ginsburg, the Administration
"opposed federal proposals further to restructure or restrict merger and acquisition activity as
unnecessary bits of legislation that would intrude into the area of state corporation law. It is
our view that mergers perform beneficial functions in the economy and, in the absence of
competition problems, should not be inhibited by law." Ginsburg, supra note 91, at 256.
122. See ARMENTANO, supra note 97, at 1 (stating that, "[c]onglomerate and vertical
integration mergers-which rarely harbor any direct threat to restrict market output or reduce
consumer welfare-are now of only limited concern to the antitrust authorities"); ROBERT H.
BORI, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 406 (1978); see also Malcom R. Pfunder, Developments in
Merger Law and Enforcement 1989-90, 59 ANITrRUST L.J. 319, 324 (1990).
123. Leslie Wayne, Buyouts Altering Face of CorporateAmerica, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23,
1985, at 1, col. 1.
124. See Number of Acquisitions in 1986 Shatters Grimm's 13 Year Record, 52 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1302, at 269 (Feb. 12, 1987).
125.

See

U.S.

DEP'T

OF

COMMERCE,

STATISTICAL

ABSTRACT

OF

THE

UNITED

STATEs-1990 534 (1990). The full impact of this figure can be realized when it is corn-
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merger activity, almost all of the cases were initiated by private parties, and not by the Justice Department' 2 6 For example, between
1981 and 1985, the Department of Justice challenged only twentyeight mergers and throughout the entire Reagan Administration, the
federal agencies 127initiated no cases challenging conglomerate or vertical transactions.
While the Justice Department was not involved in preventing
mergers, they did intervene on the side of mergers. This intervention
came in the form of the filing of amici curiae briefs with the Supreme Court and appellate courts." s This approach to reshaping law
is not unusual; when an appellate court grants the Department's request to intervene, it is acting in a similar vein as does the Supreme
Court when they request the views of the Justice Department 129 to
aid them in deciding cases based on antitrust issues. 3 ' Most commentators agree that if an administration wants to narrow the scope of
a law,' intervention in private litigation is a route that they must
take. 3 2 This aggressive program of intervention'33 was met by
Congress with as much hostility as were the Justice Department's
merger and vertical restraint guidelines."3 The most nefarious example of this can be seen in the case of Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite

pared with the 1245 mergers and acquisitions that occurred in 1978. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATE-1980 575 (1980).
126. See Flynn, supra note 97, at 1102.
127. See Fox & Sullivan, supra note 90, at 948; Kovacic, supra note 99, at 66; see also
Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90 COLUM.
L. REv. 1805, 1809 (1990) (noting that "[a]lthough there were roughly six times as many
mergers of substantial size in 1987 compared to 1979, there was roughly one-third as much
government enforcement"). But see Rule & Meyer, supra note 101, at 256-57 (arguing that
the Reagan Administration challenged a substantially fewer percentage of mergers because
changing economic conditions and increased clarity within merger guidelines resulted in the
filing of fewer anticompetitive mergers).
128. See Ginsburg, supra note 91, at 264. The administration had a policy of only
intervening as amidi at the appellate level because material issues of fact were settled by that
stage in the litigation. Id.
129. The Supreme Court routinely seeks the opinions of those agencies responsible for
enforcing different laws. See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (suggesting that
the Court pays great deference to those charged with enforcement of the law).
130. See Fox & Sullivan, supra note 90, at 354.
131. See Campbell, supra note 91, at 354; Fox & Sullivan, supra note 90, at 951.
132. As a corollary, if the administration wants to expand the law, "it can have this
influence by bringing its own cases." Campbell, supra note 91, at 354. But see, e.g., Flynn,
supra note 97, at 1095 (commenting that the filing of amii briefs is an improper route for
the administration to follow).
133. See Fox & Sullivan, supra note 90, at 951.
134. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
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Service Corp.135 In Monsanto, the Justice Department filed an amicus brief with the Supreme Court, unsuccessfully urging"s6 that the
Court overturn the long-established procedure of applying a per se
rule "37
' of illegality to agreements to maintain resale prices, and replace it with the softened rule of reason test."" Congress was so
angered by the filing, which went against its recently affirmed view
on the subject, that they placed a gag order on the Justice Department
appropriations bill. 39 The order prohibited the Department from
spending any money on attempting to overturn they per se prohibition
on resale price maintenance, and asked the Attorney General to withdraw the vertical restraint guidelines which sought to avoid the per se
rule."
Along with this reformulated interpretation of traditional doctrine,

135. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
136. The Supreme Court rejected the Justice Department's argument in an eight to zero
decision. Justice White took no part in the decision of the case. Monsanto 465 U.S. at 753.
137. In the context of an antitrust inquiry, per se illegality has been defined as "certain
agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of
any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for
their use." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957).
138. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Monsanto Co.
v. Spray Rite Sew. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (No. 82-914).
In Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), Justice Brandeis
set forth a now famous definition of the rule'of reason test:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied;
its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to
exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to
be attained, are all relevant facts.
Id. at 238.
139. See Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies
Appropriation Act, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-180, § 605, 99 Stat. 1136, 1169-70 (1985).
140. Id.; see also Congress Takes Affirmative Steps to Attack Vertical Restraint Guidelines, 49 ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1244, at 1019-20 (Dec. 12, 1985). In
addition, nineteen Senators and Representatives filed a brief as amicus curiae in the Monsanto
case urging the Court to permit Congress to direct national antitrust policy and not allow it
to be set by executive decision. See Brief for the Undersigned Senators and Representatives
as amicus curiae, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (No. 82914).
It should be noted that this softened stance against retail price maintenance puts in
doubt the Paramount decrees broad prohibitions on the fixing of admission prices. If studios
had wished to engage in such practices, it would appear that they might not have met any
resistance from the Justice Department
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the Administration introduced a new vocabulary that was designed to
perpetuate its ideals.14 Many of the long standing and commonly
understood terms were replaced with new terms and new definitions
that reflected the Administration's new policies."4 Professors Fox
and Sullivan explore one of the most glorifying examples, the replacement of "public good" with "consumer welfare." '
While
"public good" was thought to relate solely to the consumer,' and
was reflected in decreased cost and increased choice, "consumer welfare" was looked at as the sum of both producer and consumer welfare.145 Thus, if as a result of certain practices, producers benefitted
to a greater extent than consumers were harmed, "consumer welfare"
was increased." So, while the shell of past antitrust laws still existed, the substance of its past application and resulting impact had all
but vanished.
This laissez-faire attitude and new application of antitrust doctrine was used by the studios to reshape the motion picture industry.
Under the Reagan Administration's policies, the Paramount consent
decrees were allowed to sit idle and unenforced. 47 With Reagan in
the White House, movie studios could once again "reassembl[e] the
vertical integration surrendered in 1948."
The complete resurgence of vertical integration followed a cautious path that culminated in an explosion of purchasing in 1985. 4 "

141. See Fox & Sullivan, supra note 90, at 945-47.
142. This was reflected in the guidelines that the Administration issued. See Betty Bock,
Commentary, The Shifting Vocabulary of Antitrust-Legal Linguistics in a Period of Change,
36 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 362, 338 (1985).
143. Fox & Sullivan, supra note 90, at 946.
144. "Congress meant to protect consumers and others from exploitation and bullying.
Congress did not value a dollar to producers equally with a dollar to consumers: nor did it
value a dollar to exploiting producers equally with a dollar to striving entrepreneurs." Eleanor
M. Fox, Consumer Beware Chicago, 84 MicH. L. REV. 1714, 1715 n.5 (1986).
145. Id. at 1715; see also Fox & Sullivan, supra note 90, at 946.
146. See BORI, supra note 122, at 90-106; see also Correia, supra note 101, at 331
(noting that "[tihe Chicago School teaches that the creation of market power which can be
offset by an accompanying reduction in production costs is socially benign even if it results
in price increases to consumers"); Rule & Meyer, supra note 101, at 255 (describing merger
conduct that threatens consumers as that conduct which "threatens to raise prices and to
restrict output without generating offsetting efficiency gains").
147. See Gary Arnold, The Party's Over; The 80s in Review, WASH. TiMES, Dec. 28,
1989, at El.
148. Alexander Cockburn, The Mission: Reagan. Hollywood and the American Empire,
THE NATION, Apr. 18, 1987, at 494.
149. Prior to 1963, Stanley Warner Pictures was granted permission to engage in the
production and distribution of Cinamerica pictures. In the hopes of increasing the amount of
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The first attempt at reentry by a major defendant was initiated in
1980 by Loew's Theaters, Inc. ("LTIT). 1 o LTI petitioned Judge
Palmieri' 5 t for total relief from its consent decree.1 52 LTI wanted
permission to enter the motion picture distribution industry. The court
did not vacate the original decree, but it did grant LTI limited permission to enter the production and distribution business. This order
was subject to a new decree prohibiting it from showing its own
pictures, and binding it to the same conduct restrictions in the original decrees." 3 This was the first substantive modification allowing
reintegration to one of the original decrees.lm Although it did noth-

quality motion pictures available for exhibition, National General Corporation, subject to the
Twentieth Century-Fox decree, was granted temporary permission to enter the production and
distribution business on June 24, 1963. This grant was further extended on two later occasions. See United States v. Loew's Inc., 1969 Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,767 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
150. LTI was the successor to the New Theater Company, which was formed when the
original Loew's defendant to the Paramount case had to divorce its theater operations from
its production and distribution operations.
151. Judge Palmieri had presided over the decrees since they were handed down by the
court. Judge Palmieri had this continuing authority over the defendants because of jurisdictional clauses in the decrees. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 1952-53 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 67,228 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (Loew's Consent Decree, Section lI1(7)(b)). Furthermore, it
is well established that "[a] court that enters an initial antitrust consent decree has the
inherent power to modify that decree." John D. Anderson, Note, Modifications of Antitrust
Consent Decrees: Over a Double Barrel, 84 MIcH. L. REv. 134 (1985).
152. Loew's, 1952-53 Trade Cas. (CCH)
67,228 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (Loew's Consent
Decree).
63,662 (S.D.N.Y.
153. United States v, Loew's Inc., 1980-1981 Trade Cas. (CCH)
1980). The court granted the requested relief in the hopes that "[w]ith the entry of Loew's
into production and distribution, some addition to the limited number of top box office
pictures can be expected." Id. at 77,553.
154. On July 25, 1974, the decrees had been modified to allow the divorced theater
circuits to acquire theaters newly created by or for the defendants without a court finding
that they would not result in a restraint of competition. See United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,378 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
This modification was desired because of a clause in the original decrees that mandated that the defendants petition the court before they acquired any beneficial interest in a
theater. This permission would only be granted upon a showing that the acquisition would
.not unduly restrain competition." See, e.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 1952-53 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 67,228, at 63,328 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (Loew's Consent Judgement, Section IH(7)(b)).
In the years following Paramount, hundreds of applications to acquire theaters were
filed with the court. See generally United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1980-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 63,553 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (reviewing the history of the courts role in the Paramount case).

Also, in 1979, the Mann Theater Corporation of California ("Mann") petitioned the
court for permission to acquire theaters in various domestic markets. Mann had acquired the
theater assets of National General Theaters Inc., the theater circuit that had been divorced
from Twentieth Century-Fox. The court granted Mann's request for a modification of the Fox
decree on February 14, 1980. The modification allowed Mann to acquire theaters on a
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ing to diminish the effects of the decrees, it signaled the beginning of
the end for the restrictions that had been placed on the motion picture
industry forty years prior.
The LTI decision was followed one year later by the purchase of
forty-eight percent of the Walter Reade theater chain by Columbia
Pictures. 55 Technically this was not a "reentry," because Columbia
had never owned theaters in the past.' 56 Thus, Columbia had never
been barred from the exhibition business.157 Nevertheless, like other
distribution companies, Columbia avoided the exhibition business out
of fear of instigating a new round of legal battles with the Justice
Department. They had patiently waited for the ideal climate before
entering the exhibition business, and the Reagan Administration provided it. 5
These two initial transactions were followed by two years of
cautious observance by the studios. What the studios did not know
was that during this period, Assistant Attorney General William
Baxter had begun a departmental review of almost all antitrust consent decrees that were over ten years old. The Department was reviewing all decrees that were "either out of date, anticompetitive, or
based on theories out of favor with the Reagan Administration."159
According to Jeffrey I. Zukerman, special assistant to William Baxter,
the review would affect most decrees restricting vertical conduct by
the defendants; 1" this included the Paramount decrees.16 ' After
review by the Justice Department, a decision had been reached by the
end of 1981 that under the Administration's new pro-merger thinking,
the decrees had "outlived their usefulness."162 The Department on
its own volition decided that the safeguards that had been instigated
at the suggestion of the Supreme Court were no longer needed.

restricted basis for ten years and thereafter to make further acquisitions without having to
63,553 at 76,951.
petition the court. See Paramount, 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
155. Andrew L. Yarrow, The Studios' Move on Theaters, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1987, at
DI, col. 3.
156. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 77-83.
158. Paul J. Tagliabue, Developments 1986-87: Antitrust Developments in Sports and
Entertainment,56 ANTIrRUsT LJ. 341 (1987).
159. Antitrust Division Begins Review of 014 Discredited Consent Decrees, ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), No. 1032, at A-16 (Sept. 24, 1981).
160. Id.
161. Leslie M. Werner, U.S. to Rule on Lifting Movie Antitrust Decrees, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 4, 1985, at D2, col. 1.

162. Yarrow, supra note 155, at 1.
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By 1983, the dam was beginning to crack. CBS, Inc. ("CBS")
and Columbia Pictures, together with Home Box Office ("HBO")
sought Justice Department approval for a joint venture that would
create a new motion picture studio, TriStar Pictures. 63 Approval
was sought because of the antitrust questions that arose from the
marriage of producer Columbia with exhibitors CBS and HBO."6
Although such unions were one of the main concerns in the earlier
case, the Justice Department investigated the venture and approved the
merger. The Department went so far as to find that the creation of
this new company would effectuate an increase rather than a decrease
in competition within the industry.'65
The TriStar deal was followed a year later by the Justice
Department's providing the still-cautious studios with the green light
that they had been waiting for. The Department took the initiative
and offered to support the studios if they sued to get back into the
theater business.' 66 In a press release dated February 4, 1985, the
Department announced that they would no longer enforce the Paramount decrees because of changed circumstances in the industry.67
"Although no studios took up that offer, they undoubtedly saw the
new position as a clear signal that the Justice Department would not
try to block theater acquisitions. " ' 6 With this support from the Justice Department, all that the studios needed was a successful court
challenge seeking complete relief from one of the original restrictive
decrees. 69
This challenge came in 1986 when the newly formed TriStar
Pictures'70 purchased Loew's (now LTI) and petitioned the court for
total relief from the original and subsequent Loew's decrees.' The

163. See Judi Hasson, HBO, CBS, Columbia May Become New Movie Giant, UNITED
PRESS INT'I, Sept. 14, 1983, BC cycle (available on LEXIS).
164. The legality of the deal was further put into doubt by the financing that HBO had
proposed. They offered to help finance the films that TriStar produced in exchange for
exclusive pay television rights to the pictures. Exclusive engagement arrangements had been
specifically banned by the original decrees. See supra note 79.
165. See Hasson, supra note 163.
166. Yarrow, supra note 155, at 3.
167. See Ed Cray, Hollywood Unchained, 6 CAL. LAW. 33, 54 (Feb. 1986).
168. Id.
169. Although the Justice Department could issue opinions on the subject, the final
decision still rested in the hands of the district court. See supra note 151.
170. TriStar, as a new company, was not bound by the restraints promulgated by the

original decrees.
171. United States v. Loew's Inc., 1980-1981 Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,662 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); United States v. Loew's Inc., 1952-1953 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,228 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)
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Reagan Justice Department fully supported the merger of these two
companies," 2 heeding the cries from the independent theater owners
that the "loss of the decrees could jeopardize their continued existence
and would also hurt movie-goers." 3 Assistant Attorney General J.
Paul McGrath sent a letter to Judge Palmieri suggesting that "it may
be appropriate for the court and the parties to consider whether a
termination date" 74 should be added to the decrees. Furthermore,
the Justice Department stated that it believed that "competition in
distribution or exhibition would not be unreasonably restrained, even
if TriStar and Loew's dealt exclusively with one another." 7 ' Succumbing to the pressure of the Justice Department, Judge Palmieri
granted this request and vacated the decree. 76
As a result of the approval of the Loew's and TriStar deal, a
"madcap rush to vertical reintegration"" began. For example, in
August of 1986, Warner Bros. Inc., one of the original Paramount
defendants, petitioned the court for total relief from their decree'
so that they could reenter the exhibition business with the purchase of
interests in several theater chains. 79 Although the court at first only
granted temporary relief,"'0 the appellate court did eventually grant
Warner Bros. total relief from the original decree."' This left them
able to reenter the exhibition business without any of the original
safeguards left in place.

(Loew's Consent Decree).
172. See Tagliabue, supra note 158, at 346.
173. Werner, supra note 161, at 1.
174. Al Delugach, Justice Won't Oppose Theater Ban on Studios; Antitrust Chief Says
Industry Isn't Interested in Seeking Change in Court, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 1985, at IVI.
175. See Tagliabue, supra note 158, at 346. This is an amazing statement in light of the
strong stance that was taken against exclusivity contracts in the original case.
176. Order of Judge Palmieri, June 18, 1987 (as reported in Tagliabue, supra note 158,
at 347).
177. Nick Gilbert, You Kil Like 'B' Movies, FIN. WoRLD, Apr. 7, 1987, at 33.

62,765 (S.D.N.Y.
178. United States v. Loew's Inc., 1950-1951 Trade Cas. (CCH)
1951) (Warner Consent Judgement).
179. United States v. Loew's Inc., 882 F.2d 29, 30 (2d Cir. 1989).
180. United States v. Loew's Inc., 705 F. Supp. 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). The court allowed
Warner to proceed with the purchases but continued to restrict their conduct as a distributor
and ordered that they do business with the newly acquired theaters on an arms length basis.
Id. at 885. In denying Wamer's petition for total relief, Judge Palmieri found that the motion
picture industry is a "concentrated industry in which there has been a recent trend toward
vertical integration which appears significanL" Id. Judge Palmieri also expressed his fears that
there was "a climate of non-compliance with the heart of the consent judgemens-that films
be licensed theater by theater, solely on the merits and without discrimination." Id.
181. Loew's, 882 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1989).
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Between 1985 and 1988, movie companies spent more than one
billion dollars in the purchasing of independent movie theaters." 2
The exhibition industry had not seen such a rush to purchase theaters
since a similar craze in the 1930s."8 3 Spurred by hopes of bolstering
the economy and convinced that large scale vertical mergers were
more helpful than harmful, the Reagan Administration's new policies
succeeded in returning the structure of the entire motion picture industry back to the state that it had been in before circuit divorcement
and theater divestiture in the 1930s. As the motion picture industry
was still a concentrated club that was once again becoming vertically
integrated, the natural question to arise was whether the evils that
were stamped out by the original decrees would now return in their
absence.
III.

THE CURRENT STATE OF THE INDUSTRY

It was not long before the victims of the motion picture
industry's monopolistic practices, whose protection the original decrees were supposed to ensure, found themselves struggling to survive. As was the case fifty years earlier, while theater acquisitions by
the studios grew, so did market domination by the circuits."' The
power that these circuits obtained placed a tight squeeze on independent theater owners,"' causing the number of non-affiliated" circuits and theaters to decline dramatically. According to the latest
statistics, of the more than 24,000 movie screens nationally, affiliated
exhibitors control about eleven percent of the screens. 18 7 Of the top
ten theater circuits in the nation, five, including the two largest, are

182. See Michael Stremfel, Movie Studios Direct More than $1 Billion into Theater
Chains, L.A. Bus. L, -Sep. 19, 1988, at 1. During this period, four of the major studios
Matsushita (parent company of Universal), Paramount, Sony, and Warner Brothers made

significant entries into the exhibition business; see also STANDARD & POOR'S, Industry
Surveys-Leisure Time Basic Analysis 24 (Mar. 12, 1992).
183. See Tagiabue, supra note 158, at 342-43.
184. Id. at 343; see also DONAHUE, supra note 88, at 107.
185. See Daniel M. Kimmel, Al Says Nix to Switch in Flx, BOsTON Bus. I., Feb. 1,
1988, at 1..
186. "An affiliated exhibitor is a firm or corporation engaged in the exhibition of motion
pictures which is owned, operated or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a producer or
distributor of motion picture films." United States v. Balaban, 26 F. Supp. 491, 495 (N.D. Ill.
1939).
187. See STANDARD & POOR's, supra note 182, at 24. At the time the Paramount case
was brought, the major defendants controlled 17.3% of the nation's most lucrative theaters.
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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affiliated with one of the major distributors.' On Long Island, for
example, since Ronald Reagan took over the Presidency in 1980, the
number of independently owned and operated theaters has dropped
from 114 to only 20 today.8 9
For the independent exhibitors and producers, one of the most
terrifying aspects of this resurgence was the reasoning that the major
studios extolled for wanting to reenter the exhibition business. Comments by analysts and the studios alike seemed to reflect a desire to
bring about similar controls as had existed in the industry in the
1930s. For example, Christopher Pearce, the chief operating officer of
Cannon Pictures, was quoted as saying, "If you make films, it is
rather smart to have a place to show them."" 9 This statement is in
clear opposition to the clauses in the consent decrees that mandated
that motion pictures be distributed theater by theater and without
discrimination."9 ' Furthermore, by owning screens, the studios could
delay video releases until they drained all possible exhibition profits, 192 and theater ownership would guarantee that a below-average

film would get a "decent screen even when the box office [was] marginal." 1" Although these philosophies raise issues and questions that
are similar to those that eventually brought about the original decrees,
the Justice Department did not react."9 Even when Warner Brothers
extolled what could be considered blatant anti-competitive attitudes
while seeking to have their original decree terminated,'9 5 and in the

188. As of March of 1992, the largest circuit was United Artists and the second largest
was Cineplex Odeon, owned by Matsushita, the parent company of distributor Universal. At
that time, the sixth largest circuit, Cinamerica, was owned by Paramount and Warner Brothers. Seventh on the list was Loew's, owned by Columbia's parent, Sony, and tenth was
Famous Players, owned by Paramount. See STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 182, at 24.
189. Vivian Kellerman, Fade Out: Independent Cinemas Declining, N.Y. TIME, Dec. 29,
1991, at 1, § 12.
190. Geraldine Fabrikant, Cannon to Buy Chain of Theaters, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1986,
at D4, col. 6. It should be noted that the desire to have guaranteed access to screens to
exhibit their films was a predominant reason that the studios began their theater purchasing
campaign earlier in the century. See supra section L
191. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
192. Kathryn Harris, Box-Office Potential Entices Large Chains, Movie Makers, L.A.
TIMEs, July 27, 1986, at IV1, IVS.
193. See Gilbert, supra note 177. This practice is reminiscent of the banned practice of
block booking which had provided access to screens for undesirable films.
194. See Kimmel, supra note 185.
195. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. Warner argued that they needed to be
able to own theaters to effectively compete with the other distributors who were not bound
by decrees and who were reentering the exhibition business. United States v. Loew's Inc. 705
F. Supp. 878, 884-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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face of opposition by the National Association of Theater Owners," s the Justice Department continued to support their petition to
reenter the exhibition business."
With the studios firmly entrenching themselves in the motion
picture exhibition business, they were quickly able to effectuate a
remarkable decline in independent theater ownership by reusing, in
different forms, many of the trade practices that had been declared
illegal in the 1930s. For example, although divestiture, and the mandate that motion pictures be distributed theater-by-theater solely on
the merits and without discrimination,19 8 had been enacted to help
ensure that independent exhibitors would regain some bargaining power against the circuits; 1 the reintegration, as supported by the Reagan Administration, virtually removed these safeguards altogether. As
affiliated and nonaffiliated circuits continued to grow in size and with
the deep pockets of these large circuits against them, independent
theaters were eliminated from the competition to obtain first run motion pictures.2"° While there is no evidence of the use of collusive
or discriminatory behavior by distributors or affiliated circuits, the
market power of the large affiliates2 ' that had worried the Paramount court?' has been allowed to resurface.

Although the court found that Warner had legitimate concerns and business reasons for
wanting to reenter the exhibition business, this is a less than compelling argument. What is
puzzling about this argument is that the distributors were not supposed to be able to gain a
competitive advantage through theater ownership. Without such advantage, how could Warner
Brothers be disadvantaged?
196. United States v. Loew's Inc., 882 F.2d 29, 32 n.3 (2d Cir. 1989).
197. See id. at 30.
198. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 1950-1951 Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,765 at
64,266 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (Warner Consent Judgment § n1(8)).
199. See CONANT, supra note 7, at 74.
200. See DONAHU, supra note 88, at 108; Harris, supra note 192.
201. In the past, circuits used their bargaining power to destroy their competition by
obtaining exclusive privileges from distributors which left non-circuit theaters without enough
product to fill their screens. These practices were employed in markets in which circuits
owned theaters and even in those in which they did not. See United States v. Griffith, 334
U.S. 100 (1948).
202. In determining that a system of competitive bidding involves the judiciary too
deeply in the day to day operations of the industry, the court recognized that:
The trade victims of this conspiracy have in large measure been the small
independent operators. They are the ones that have felt most keenly the discriminatory practices and predatory activities in which defendants have frequently indulged.
They have been the victims of the massed purchasing power of the units in the
industry. It is largely outof the ruins of small operators that the large empires of
exhibitors have been built.
United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 162 (1948).
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Independent exhibitors have also been injured by the practice of
authorizing subsequent repeat runs of a picture in the same theater
that had the first run. This practice enabled a circuit theater to obtain
for itself all of the exhibition value of a movie.2"° With the circuits
building many new multi-screen theaters, and revamping many old
single screen theaters into such giants, they were permitted to show a
motion picture in subsequent runs on smaller screens in the same
theater.' 4 Once again, the market power of the circuits left indepenwithout any quality films to show on their
dent exhibitors
2 5
screens.

0

n an attempt at rectifying the imbalance of bargaining power
have maintained over exhibitors in the licensing of
distributors
that
2°6
motion pictures, twenty-four states have at some time passed motion picture licensing laws.2"r These statutes are predominantly concerned with the practice of blind bidding, and uniformly regulate or
ban the practice. Most of the statutes also regulate the bidding proce-

203. See CONANT, supra note 7, at 83-88; DONAHUE supra note 88, at 107.
204. See Harris, supra note 192.
205. See Werner, supra note 161.
206. Motion picture licensing usually occurs under a competitive bidding, competitive or
noncompetitive negotiation, or track system. With competitive bidding, distributors send
exhibitors solicitation letters informing the exhibitors of the release of new films. These
letters contain a minimum amount of information about the film, possibly the stars and a
brief plot synopsis, and suggested terms for the licensing of the film. If the distributor is
unhappy with the bids that they receive, they will either solicit new bids or negotiate directly
with the exhibitors. Lastly, the track system is sometimes used when there is an established
relationship between an exhibitor and a distributor. See United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc.,
756 F. Supp. 502, 503-04 (7th Cir. 1985).
207. These states are: Alabama (ALA. CODE §§ 8-18-1 to 8-18-4 (1984)); Arkansas (ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 4-75-901 to 4-75-906 (Michie 1991)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-292
to 10-1-294 (1989)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE §§ 18-7701 to 18-7708 (1987)); Indiana (IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 24-1-5-1 to 24-1-5-7 (West 1980)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-101 to 51-203
(1983)); Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 365.750 to 365-760 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1987)); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37.2901 to 37.2905 (West 1988)); Maine (ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 §§ 1901 to 1905 (Repealed 1983)); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 93F, §§ I to 4 (Law. Co-op. 1984)); Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 407.350
to 407.357 (Vernon 1988)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-301 to 30-14-308 (1991));
New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-SA-1 to 57-5A-5 (Michie 1978)); North Carolina (N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 75C-1 to 75C-5 (1992)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. §§ 133.05 to 133.07
(Anderson 1979)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 646.890 (1990)); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 73, §§ 203-01 to 203-11 (1971 & Supp. 1992)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 395-510 to 39-5-560 (Law Co-op. 1976)); Tennessee (I'ENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-701 to 4725-704 (1988)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-13-1 to 13-13-7 (1986 & Supp. 1992));
Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-255 to 59.1-261 (Michie 1992)); Washington (WASH. REV.
CODE. ANN. §§ 19.58.010 to 19.58.905 (West 1989)); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE §§ 47llD-1 to 47-11D-4 (1992)); and Wisconsin (WIs. STAT. ANN. § 134.23 (West 1989)).
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dure for licensing motion pictures, and prohibit the use of advances2 °2 and guarantees. 2°9 Quite obviously, motion picture distributors have not been happy with these statutes and have brought many
court cases21 ° challenging their constitutionality under the Commerce
Clause, Supremacy Clause, and the First Amendment. 2 ' Despite
these challenges, courts have upheld the validity of these laws.212
Unfortunately, these laws do nothing to protect the independent and
non-circuit theater owner from the bargaining power of the affiliated
and circuit exhibitors.
Exhibitors themselves have also attempted to obtain some bargaining strength against the distributors with the use of "split agreements." Split agreements are the practice whereby exhibitors in a given market split the rights to negotiate for the rental of upcoming
films.
Split agreements ensure that each split member has an initial right
to bid or opportunity to negotiate for certain films without competition from other split members. Because other split members agree
not to submit bids for films that have not been designated to them,
initially the split designee faces 21competition
only from exhibitors
3
who are not members of the split.

As with state film licensing laws, distributors desiring to maintain their bargaining strength have challenged the legality of such
agreements under the Sherman Act.21 4 Although in many cases
courts had been unwilling to impede their use, 2 15 in most cases,
208. Advances are funds paid prior to the exhibition of a picture as security for the
performance of the license agreement or to be applied to payments under such an agreement.
See Grant, supra note 21, at 368.
209. A guarantee is a minimum dollar amount which the exhibitor guarantees a distributor will receive for granting the license to exhibit a particular film. See Grant, supra note 21,
at 368.
210. See, e.g., Warner Bros., Inc. v. Wilkinson, 533 F. Supp. 105 (D. Utah 1981);
Associated Film Dist. Corp. v. Thomburgh, 520 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Pa. 1981), rev'd 683 F.
2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982), on remand, 614 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa.), aftd, 800 F.2d 369 (3d
Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom., Associated Film Distrib. Corp. v. Casey, 480 U.S. 933
(1987); Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408 (S.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd in
part, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Busbee, 297 S.E.2d 250
(Ga. 1982).
211. For a detailed analysis of the constitutional arguments for and against these statutes,
see Mary Elizabeth Kilgannon, Note, Motion Picture Licensing Acts: An Analysis of the
Constitutionality of their Provisions, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 293 (1982).
212. See supra note 210.
213. Borner, supra note 87, at 165-66.
214. See id. at 160-61, 166-67.
215. See, e.g., United States v. Kerasotes Ill.
Theaters, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 963 (C.D. Ill.
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courts found them to be illegal restraints of trade. 16 Either way,
split agreements do nothing to balance bargaining power in favor of
small independent theaters because these exhibitors are excluded from
2 1 and are left in direct competition with the larger
the agreements
211
circuits.
The Reagan Administration's new outlook on antitrust law has
also affected independent producers. The illegal practices of the Paramount defendants were, in part, designed to keep independent producers from having access to screens upon which to exhibit their
films. 2 9 They were able accomplish this by controlling the distribution arm of the industry and engaging in practices such as block
booking. So even if producers could get the financing to make a
motion picture, they could not get the picture shown in theaters without the aid of the studios. As predicted,220 this situation has resurfaced today. The "[d]istribution arm of the motion picture industry
has become increasingly concentrated in several major companies.,221
By the end of the 1980s, the major studios took in "more then
90 cents of every dollar earned from the distribution of movies."2 2
This figure has risen since then. In 1991, independents produced
roughly 275 movies and distributed 286 movies, with the major studios producing 133 movies and distributing 147 movies.' While

1982); Greenbrier Cinemas, Inc., v. Attorney General, 511 F. Supp. 1046 (W.D. Va. 1981).
216. See United States v. Capital Ser., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (criticizing the Greenbrier decision and holding that these agreements are a per so violation of
antitrust law); see also DONAHUE, supra note 88, at 126.
217. The court in Capitol Ser,., 568 F. Supp. at 142, found that the defendants had
formed the split agreements "for the purpose of eliminating competition among themselves."
218. Independent exhibitor dissatisfaction with split agreements can be seen from the
numerous law suits that have been brought challenging their legality. See, 4.g., Southway
Theaters, Inc. v. Georgia Theater Co., 672 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1982); Wilder Enter. v. Allied
Artists Picture Corp., 632 F.2d 1135 (4th Cir. 1980); Admiral Theater Corp. v. Douglas
Theater Co., 585 F. 2d 877 (8th Cir. 1978); Syufy Enterprises v. Nat'l Gen. Theaters, Inc.,
575 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 954 (1978); Cinema-Tex Enter. v.
Santikos Theaters, Inc., 535 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1976); The Movie 1&2 v. United Artists
Communications, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd, 909 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir.
1990); General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal.
1982).
219. See supra section I.
220. See Arnold, supra note 147.
221. Kilgannon, supra note 211, at 293 (emphasis added).
222. Elaine Dutka, A Decade Driven by Dollars, not Dreams, L.A. TIES, Dec. 29,
1989, at F6, F8.
223. These statistics were computed from charts printed in VARIETY, Dec. 23, 1991 at
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these figures seem to indicate that the independent producers have
been able to grab a large share of the market, in reality, the movies
produced by the seven major studios took in 91% of the total domestic box office receipts.2 4 So, while independent producers have not
been prevented from making films, the control over distribution2
has given the major studios control over almost all of the revenues
that American films generate at the box office.
CONCLUSION

It took only two terms in the White House for President Reagan
to bring about the return of the anti-competitive aura of the 1930s to
the motion picture industry. Eliminated are the safeguards that were
once designed to open up a closed industry and protect its small
independent players. The effect that these reforms are having on
consumers and the industry can already be seen and experienced. For
example, even though exhibition profits are continually rising, this is
solely attributable to increased ticket prices, not increased audiences.
From 1975 to 1991, admissions decreased an average of 0.3% per
year wliile box office receipts increased an average of 5.3% per
year. 6 At a time when distributors and exhibitors are continually
losing audiences to pay cable and home video, 7 it would seem
prudent to ensure the production of higher quality films and provide
incentives to audiences with lower priced admissions. Unfortunately,
as prices have been going up, and box office receipts are accounting
for less and less of the studio revenue,2 8 product has been declin229
ing in quality.

13-14.
224. See STANDARD & POOR'S supra note 181, at 21.
225. The distribution industry remained concentrated after the Paramount case but the
move back into exhibition once again helped those in control secure their power. See generally Whitney, supra note 22, at 190-91 (explaining how the majors didn't lose significant
power after the Paramount case).
226. GOLDMAN SACHS & CO., INvESTMENT RESEARH-MOviE INDUSTRY UPDATE-1992,
9 (Mar. 2, 1992) [hereinafter GOLDMAN SACHS].
227. See DONAHUE, supra note 88, at 158-69; see also Alex B. Block, Garth
Drabinsky's Pleasure Domes, FORBES, June 2, 1986, at 90, 92; supra note 2.
228. See GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 226, at 7. One reason for this decline is the increased competition for consumer entertainment dollars that has resulted from "an unprecedented rise in the number of outlets for public entertainment." Boadwin, supra note 2, at
1211.
229. See GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 226, at 9; see also United States v. Loew's Inc.,
1980-1981 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 63,662 (1980) (granting LTI's petition to reenter the production and distribution business in the hopes of increasing the amount of quality fust run
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As studios use their vast revenues to reenter the exhibition business, consumers should be getting newer and better theaters designed
to enhance their viewing experience and drive them to the movies.
Instead what we have are more profitable theaters. Any theater goer
can readily attest to the smaller screens and larger prices that have
come with the large multiplex cinemas that have replaced the "Mom
and Pop" independent theaters. Also, with the major studios in complete control of what we see, we can anticipate more sequels of
moderately entertaining motion pictures that usually steal audience
dollars and provide little of the entertainment of the original film. If
the studios wish to recapture lost revenue, there should be more emphasis placed on producing higher quality films that would entice
audiences to come to theaters and would eliminate the need for constantly increasing admission prices and large multi-screen theaters to
enhance profits.
The fate of independent production, distribution, and exhibition
appears to be sealed by the devouring of ninety percent of the total
box office income by the major studios. As for the future, the outlook can be summed up by the words of Frank Mancuso, then Chairman of Paramount Pictures: "[T]he studios want increased control
over not just theaters but pay TV, home video, and broadcasting as
well."' Hopefully, as control over the entire entertainment media
becomes more concentrated, attention will once again be focused on
the consumer, for it is the consumer that must support the industry.
Kraig G. Fox

pictures available for exhibition); United States v. Loew's Inc, 1969 Trade Cas. (CCH)
72,767 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (granting Stanley Warner Pictures permission to enter the production and exhibition business in the hopes of increasing the amount of quality first run
pictures available for exhibition). But see Whitney, supra note 22, at 193-94 (stating that one
result of Paramount was the increase in the in the quality of motion pictures).
230. Block, supra note 227, at 94.
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